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1596 
Essay 
The Political Morality of Voting in Direct 
Democracy 
Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib†
The voting levers in candidate elections and direct democ-
racy elections are identical. The political obligations that bind 
the citizens that pull them are not. This Essay argues that vot-
ers in direct democracy elections, unlike their counterparts in 
candidate elections, serve as representatives of the people and 
are, accordingly, bound by the ethics of political representation. 
Upending the traditional dichotomy between representative 
and direct democracy, this Essay explains why citizens voting 
in direct democracy are representative legislators who must 
vote in the public interest and must not vote in their private in-
terests.  
 
We begin with a simple question but one that is not asked 
often enough: Do voters have obligations to their fellow citizens 
in how they vote?1
 
†  Michael Serota has a J.D. from Berkeley Law School; Ethan J. Leib is 
Professor of Law at Fordham Law School. We thank David Ponet, Youngjae 
Lee, Aditi Bagchi, Zephyr Teachout, Andrew Kent, Michelle Singer, Ben 
Zipursky, Jason Brennan, Carl Minzner, Abner Greene, Marc Arkin, Mark 
Patterson, Steve Thel, Howie Erichson, Annie Decker, Sonia Katyal, Michael 
Gilbert, and Chris Elmendorf for conversations, leads, and suggested revisions 
that helped us prepare this paper. Fordham Law School provided financial 
support and hosted a lively faculty workshop from which this paper greatly 
benefited. Copyright © 2013 by Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib. 
 Answering this question requires a consid-
eration of the voter’s role—and relationship to her fellow citi-
zens—in a democratic polity. Although the philosophical litera-
ture on the ethics of voting does not differentiate between 
voting in candidate elections and direct democracy elections, we 
explain in this Essay how important and underappreciated dif-
ferences between these two types of voting—and the roles and 
 1. We do not consider whether there is a duty to vote in the first place; 
we ask only whether those who do vote are ethically bound to vote in a partic-
ular manner.  
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relationships they involve—can underwrite different obliga-
tions.  
Voting in direct democracy materially differs from voting 
in a candidate election, we shall argue, because voters in direct 
democracy are in a relationship of political representation with 
the citizenry. The ethics of representation accordingly constrain 
voter representatives in the kinds of reasons they can permis-
sibly use as a basis for formal action within the scope of the re-
lationship. Few, for example, think that a member of Congress 
may exclusively pursue her private interests when voting in the 
legislative chamber;2 indeed, we call that kind of self-dealing 
corruption, even when it offends no law or is impossible to 
prosecute for one practical reason or another.3 Here we argue 
that similar self-dealing in the direct democracy voting booth is 
inconsistent with the political morality of representation be-
cause the product of the legislative chamber and the direct de-
mocracy voting booth is the same: coercive law.4
 
 2. Put to one side debates over whether elected officials have a “free 
mandate” to pursue the public interest unencumbered by the direction of con-
stituents and electors. In many countries, representatives are bound by the 
doctrine of the free mandate as a first principle of public law and must leave 
their constituents’ interests at the door to the parliament halls. See MARC VAN 
DER HULST, THE PARLIAMENTARY MANDATE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(2000). While legislators may have the “prerogative of obscurantism” about the 
reasons for their votes on the parliamentary floor, see United States v. N.S. 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977), we take it as a first prin-
ciple that votes there ought to be cast in the public interest, however defined, 
rather than in legislators’ own private interests. Even if legislators also have 
some duties to their particular constituents, they clearly have no permission to 
pursue their personal private interests when they vote on behalf of the people.  
  
 3. This is not a universal view of corruption, but it is surely a “received 
conception”: “the abuse of public office for private gain.” Mark E. Warren, Po-
litical Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion, 37 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 803, 803 
(2006). One of the difficulties of this too-simple view of corruption is political 
science’s assumption that politicians are interested, first and foremost, in their 
own re-election. If the interest in re-election is a private interest, politicians 
are always corrupt under standard models of political science—and that can-
not be right. But refining the concept of corruption (and political science’s 
modeling) is not our project here. For a book-length treatment, see ZEPHYR 
TEACHOUT, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX (forthcoming 2013). 
 4. It is important to note that our argument is limited to cases of direct 
democracy that produce binding law directly. This excludes instances of direct 
democracy in which the citizenry is not enacting law, as in the referendum 
generally, where the voters serve as a vetogate in a larger lawmaking process 
involving legislators. For an introduction to the variety of direct democracy 
mechanisms and why their structural differences probably counsel for differ-
ent treatment, see Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Delibera-
tive?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006) and Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes 
Passed Through Referendums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49 (2008). There are also some 
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Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I focuses attention 
on the candidate election voter and explains how voting in the 
private interest in candidate elections coheres with the conven-
tional narrative about how American democracy is supposed to 
function.5
Having established the representative relationship be-
tween direct democracy voters and their fellow citizens, and the 
obligation of public-interest voting it entails, we further sup-
port this provocative finding with empirical and doctrinal ar-
guments. Although determining whether someone is serving as 
a political representative is principally a project of conceptual 
analysis and normative political theory, descriptive political 
science and doctrinal evidence help reinforce our argument. In 
particular, data on electoral turnout and the pluralist picture of 
U.S. politics, combined with features of First Amendment ju-
risprudence and the state action doctrine, reinforce the argu-
ment that direct democracy voters are representatives. 
 Part II argues that the internal logic of the candidate 
election voting narrative has no application to the context of di-
rect democracy: whereas voters in candidate elections are en-
gaged in the process of selecting representatives, voters in di-
rect democracy elections are acting as representatives. Direct 
democracy voters—like legislators, administrators, and other 
government officials—exercise public authority on behalf of 
others to make coercive law that binds a larger class of citizens. 
This form of citizen representation triggers certain political ob-
ligations that inhere in the normative structure of the relation-
ship between representative and represented. The most basic 
and foundational obligation is that the representative must 
vote in the pursuit of a credible and good faith conception of the 
public interest, rather than her private interests. 
Once we have identified direct democracy voters as repre-
sentatives, Part III considers in more detail the ethical obliga-
tions that attach to direct democracy voting given its repre-
sentative function. We explain how these duties clarify what it 
 
exercises of local direct democracy that are merely advisory. See, e.g., S.F. Vot-
ers Pass Advisory Measure Aimed at Restoring Coit Tower, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 
2012, 6:56 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/06/sf-voters-pass 
-advisory-measure-aimed-at-restoring-coit-tower.html (reporting on a success-
ful advisory measure in San Francisco that asked city officials for a greater 
monetary commitment to maintaining a local landmark). Since those actions 
are non-coercive and do not bind other citizens, they fall outside the ambit of 
our analysis here. 
 5. In this Essay, we decidedly do not endorse a private-interest model of 
candidate election voting. We only point out that the central justification for 
the private-interest model is absent in direct democracy.  
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means to vote in the public interest, as well as elucidate other 
important aspects of directly democratic political participation. 
Part III concludes by addressing a few potential objections.  
I.  THE CANDIDATE ELECTION VOTER IN A 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY   
The Madisonian account of representative democracy, 
deeply ingrained within the fabric of American life, offers the 
following story about what the candidate election voter is doing 
at the ballot box.6 It begins with its understanding of the citi-
zen—that “autonomous person with a great degree of freedom 
to pursue her own goals, subject to limits set by law.”7 When 
the citizen votes in a candidate election, she does so with her 
own interests in mind; she is therefore expected to cast her bal-
lot in favor of the candidate most likely to help her achieve her 
individual goals.8
Once sworn into office, that candidate, now a public officer, 
is entrusted with the authority to bind the electorate to coer-
cive law backed by the force of the state. So long as a law has 
been passed in accordance with established procedures, the pol-
 When she and her similarly self-interested 
fellow citizens have finished voting, the votes are tallied and a 
candidate is selected.  
 
 6. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1539, 1566 (1988) (contrasting the liberal, federalist conception of politics 
and the republican, neo-federalist conception of politics, and concluding that 
“the basic program of the federalists was ultimately vindicated”).  
 7. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 19 (2d ed. 2006). This liberal 
vision builds upon “ideas generated by Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Madison, and 
Mill.” Id. at 19 n.1. 
 8. See, e.g., Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the 
Explanation of Political Life, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 3, 7 (Jane J. 
Mansbridge ed., 1990) (noting Madison’s belief in the “ineradicable impulses of 
self-interest”); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 
192–93 (1967) (noting that Madison believed that the people are inevitably 
motivated by their individual interests).  
 Notwithstanding the self-interest assumption underlying the liberal mod-
el, recently “[p]olitical scientists have voiced serious doubts,” unearthing em-
pirical data that is “far more consistent with the opposite assumption of 
sociotropic motivation.” Bryan Caplan, Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Polit-
ical Failure: Reflections on the Survey of Americans and Economists on the 
Economy, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 416, 417 (2002); see also GEOFFREY BRENNAN & 
LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION 108–14 (1993) (furnishing em-
pirical evidence for and against self-interested voting). Whether the conven-
tional narrative is empirically accurate is ultimately immaterial to our argu-
ment as our only goal in this Part is to demonstrate that the conventional 
narrative exists and to explicate the assumptions that underlie it.  
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ity’s citizenry is expected to obey it. The corollary to this dele-
gation is that, notwithstanding the private interests that may 
have contributed to her election, the public officer is obligated 
to exercise the power of her office in service of the public inter-
est.9 Because the authority that inheres in political office is a 
public trust,10 all who exercise that authority are so con-
strained.11
As a matter of political theory, the Madisonian account of 
representative democracy combines a liberal view of the candi-
date election voter
 This is the conventional narrative of representative 
democracy in action.  
12 with a republican view of political repre-
sentation.13
 
 9. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the 
State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1335 (1994) (not-
ing “Madison’s vision of a national legislature in which most members, most of 
the time, look to the public good rather than to the clamor of private inter-
ests”). 
 For purposes of the present inquiry, the most dis-
 10. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public 
Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004) (describing the widely held founding-era 
view that political authority is a public trust).  
 11. There is some ambiguity about whether the elected official must pur-
sue a wholly general interest or may pursue the partial interests of her partic-
ular electorate (her state, her district), see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & 
Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles Into Public Law, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 91, 92 (2013) (exploring these issues through the lens of fiduciary 
principles), but there is really no dispute that legislators must pursue some 
credible vision of the public good, and that not doing so is a derogation of duty 
and a moral failure.  
 12. Madison’s account of the candidate election voter is liberal because it 
is based upon the citizen’s pursuit of her own private interests through the 
ballot box. Note, however, that the liberal position does not require citizens to 
vote in the private interest. Rather, the liberal position appears to be that the 
candidate election voter is permitted to cast her ballot in the private interest, 
and that when she does so, she is not acting in a blameworthy manner. A vir-
tuous voter may well be liberal but still go beyond the call of duty and vote in 
the public interest. Philosophers use the term “supererogation” to refer to acts 
or omissions that are virtuous and praiseworthy, but are not morally required. 
See DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN ETHICAL THEORY 113–41 
(1982).  
 13. Madison’s account of representation is republican because it largely, 
although not unconditionally, views “[a] lawmaker’s constituency [to be] the 
public good, and her role [] to deliberate as a trustee for the people.” 
ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 7, at 20. Contrast this with a 
purely liberal account of political representation, in which “[l]awmaking [is] 
merely the result of aggregating the preferences of a majority of representa-
tives, who mirror the preferences of a majority of their constituents.” Id. As 
Easterbrook phrases it, “Madison believed that . . . ‘the core of the political 
process is the public and rational discussion about the common good, not the 
isolated act of voting according to private preferences.’” Easterbrook, supra 
note 9, at 1329 (emphasis added) (quoting JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUD-
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tinctive feature of the Madisonian view is that, although voters 
may pursue their own interests at the ballot box,14
The most famous articulation of this view is presented in 
Federalist No. 10, in which James Madison argues for a repre-
sentative democracy based upon its unique ability to “pass” 
private interests “through the medium of a chosen body of citi-
zens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least 
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”
 the amal-
gamation of these private interests is ultimately filtered at the 
legislative level.  
15 
Selecting representatives through mass voting ensures that the 
salutary aspects of the people’s freedom to pursue private in-
terests can be enjoyed, while avoiding a society governed for 
private interests alone. In this way, Federalist No. 10 treats po-
litical representation as the “restraining, balancing, and ac-
commodating machinery for processing interests.”16
This interpretation of the Madisonian account pervades the 
legal and political philosophic literature. For example, com-
menting on Federalist No. 10, Frank Easterbrook explains that, 
in the widely accepted founding-era view, self-interested voting 
“cannot and must not be conquered.”
  
17
 
IES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 35 (1983)).  
 From this perspective, 
 14. For some philosophical support for the standard view of private-
interest voting, see Gerald F. Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Public 
Reason Liberalism, in MULTICULTURALISM AND MORAL CONFLICT 19 (Maria 
Dimova-Cookson & Peter M.R. Stirk eds., 2010). For further description (from 
someone unsympathetic), see RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITI-
ZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM 104–05 (1997) (describing the “citizen 
as consumer” account). For an argument against public-interest voting, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 113 (2003) (“[E]ven 
well-educated and well-informed people find it difficult to reason accurately 
about matters remote from their immediate concerns. People who vote on the 
basis of their self-interest are at least voting about something they know 
firsthand, their own needs and preferences. Beware the high-minded voter.”). 
For a book-length treatment of the view that all voters are morally obligated 
to pursue the public interest when voting, see JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS 
OF VOTING (2011). As noted earlier, we do not advocate for either position with 
respect to the candidate election voter; our only commitment is that candidate 
election voters are not representatives, so any such obligation does not flow 
from their status as representatives, as it does for direct democracy voters who 
are making coercive law. See supra note 5. 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 16. ALFRED DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC: POLITICAL REPRESENTA-
TION IN AMERICA 96 (1951).  
 17. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1330. 
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private interests are a boon to society: not only “are [they] to be 
treasured,” but they “are a hallmark of freedom, [and] are an 
objective of our government.”18 Yet, because of their destructive 
potential, such interests must also be tamed by the state. Mad-
ison’s solution, as Easterbrook tells it, was “government by 
elected representatives . . . [who would] make the effort neces-
sary to choose [policies] wisely” and in the public interest.19
Jane Mansbridge echoes Easterbrook, explaining how Mad-
ison’s proposal for representative democracy, like all of his con-
stitutional proposals, “had two prongs: one based on using self-
interest, and one on repressing it.”
  
20 On the one hand, “the ine-
radicable impulses of self-interest” communicated by the candi-
date election voter would drive the selection process; on the 
other hand, the representatives chosen would be “‘fit to com-
prehend and pursue great and national objects,’ with the capac-
ity to ‘refine and enlarge the public views.’”21
As Easterbrook and Mansbridge observe, the filtering 
mechanism of representative democracy is central to a private-
interest voting paradigm.
  
22 Voters get to vote in the private in-
terest, while the constitutional architecture organizing the leg-
islative process facilitates refining those private interests 
through the entrustment of political authority to those author-
ized to pursue public policy. On this account, however, the can-
didate election voter is conceptualized in a thoroughly non-
representative way—that is, as one who directly presents her 
individual interests to the political system.23
 
 18. Id. at 1331. 
 This approach 
 19. Id. at 1331–32; see also id. at 1335 (“Madison’s vision [was] of a na-
tional legislature in which most members, most of the time, look to the public 
good rather than to the clamor of private interests.”).  
 20. Mansbridge, supra note 8, at 7.  
 21. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).  
 22. For accounts aligned with Mansbridge and Easterbrook, see, for ex-
ample, Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Gov-
ernment, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 425 (1998) (commenting on Federalist No. 10, and 
offering a similar evaluation), and Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with 
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1986) (noting that, under 
Madison’s vision of representative democracy, “the role of government is not 
simply to implement preferences, but to select them through a process of de-
liberation and debate”).  
 23. For definitions of “representation,” see PITKIN, supra note 8, at 209; 
Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 
(2003); Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, 
and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214 (2009). None sees the political representative as per-
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would appear to be justified because, in the Madisonian view, 
the candidate election voter is not herself engaged in the law-
making process; she is “merely” engaged in the process of 
choosing representatives who are themselves constrained to 
legislate in the public interest.24
This, in short, is the prevailing narrative of candidate elec-
tion voting in American representative democracy. It is an ac-
count which tolerates, if not appreciates, private interests as 
inputs into the political system, and thereby suggests a non-
representative vision of the voter. Candidate election voters in-
dividually pursue their goals, while the constitutional architec-
ture of representation filters their self-interested votes through 
representatives required to make policy in the public interest. 
The representative obligation to pursue the commonweal is a 
function of a public official’s authority to act on behalf of others 
and bind them to coercive law.
 
25
II.  THE DIRECT DEMOCRACY VOTER AS POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATIVE   
 The next Part considers how 
direct democracy voting differs from voting in a candidate elec-
tion, and what implications this has for the orientation of the 
direct democracy voter to her fellow citizens.  
The view of the candidate election voter that permits self-
interested voting activity has no application to the exercise of 
direct democracy, where the votes cast directly bind citizens to 
policies backed by the coercive force of the state. The core as-
 
mitted to pursue her private interests. 
 24. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1331–32. Admittedly, the plausibil-
ity of the Madisonian view is complicated by the concept of complicity—that is, 
the possibility that voters could know ahead of time that a candidate is likely 
to engage in corrupt behavior, and nonetheless vote her into office. It is un-
clear, though, how frequent an occurrence this actually is, as important con-
straints are placed upon even the most corrupt representatives through the 
requirement of multi-member, two-house action to enact laws. But see id. at 
1333 (“Despite the genius of Madison’s plan, his predictions about the relation 
between the national government and faction have not come true.” (emphasis 
removed)); Matthew L. Spitzer, Evaluating Direct Democracy: A Response, 4 
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 37, 39 (1997) (“The process of organizing and 
running a modern legislature is far from the ideal that the framers might have 
embraced.”). Regardless, our argument in this paper is not for the Madisonian 
model in the representative context, but against the application of that model 
to direct democracy voting.  
 25. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary 
Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Ethan J. Leib & 
David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with 
Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012). 
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sumption that sanctions private-interest voting—that the self-
interested preferences of the citizenry are filtered through 
those bound to pursue the public interest—are decidedly absent 
from direct democracy. These material differences suggest that 
the direct democracy voter is herself structurally in a relation-
ship of political representation with her fellow citizens.26
In classic exercises of what is usually called “representa-
tive democracy,” representatives in the legislative chambers do 
the deliberating and the negotiating that lead to the production 
of coercive law for the polity. The entrustment that inheres in 
the authority to make coercive law binds representatives to uti-
lize the mechanisms of debate, discussion, and information 
gathering to devise sound policy in the public interest. Consider 
Phil Frickey: 
  
The legislative process provides many opportunities for gathering rel-
evant information and deliberating about it. Committee hearings and 
floor debates are the most visible of these processes, but there is also 
much of practical importance in more informal contacts such as dis-
cussions with constituents and lobbyists, staff studies, consultations 
with officers of the executive branch and subdivisions of state gov-
ernment, and conversations among legislators.27
The states, cities, and localities that employ direct democ-
racy, however, choose to make binding policies through the ini-
tiative process precisely to avoid the filtration that deliberation 
and negotiation in the legislative chambers provide.
 
28
Th[e] group [running an initiative] (perhaps only a small number of 
individuals) has total control over framing the issue and drafting the 
measure. Ordinarily a consultant is hired to handle these matters, in-
cluding hiring paid signature solicitors. Once the petitions are floated 
to the public for signature, there is no way to correct any drafting 
problems discovered later, or to reformulate the measure in light of 
new facts, new arguments, or any sense of compromise. It is all or 
 Frickey, 
again: 
 
 26. For earlier treatments of the concept of citizen representation, see 
Mark Brown, Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation, 14 J. POL. 
PHIL. 203 (2006); Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Citizen Representation and 
the American Jury, in IMPERFECT DEMOCRACIES: THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 269 (Patti Tamara Lenard & Richard Sime-
on eds., 2012); Mark Stephan, Citizens as Representatives: Bridging the Demo-
cratic Theory Divides, 32 POL. & POL’Y 118 (2004); Mark E. Warren, Citizen 
Representatives, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 50 (Mark E. War-
ren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008). 
 27. Frickey, supra note 22, at 435. 
 28. More than two-thirds of the U.S. population lives in either a city or a 
state with the initiative, and most indications show that this number will only 
grow. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 8 (2004).  
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nothing, up or down, an unamendable matter. No hearings need be 
held and, in any event, whatever might be said at public meetings can 
have no effect on the measure’s language.29
The use of direct democracy reflects a choice by citizens to 
leave deliberation and negotiation, as well as the authorization 
to make binding law, to themselves. However, it is precisely be-
cause the direct democracy voter is authorized to make coercive 
law and bind her fellow citizens that she, like any other elected 
official in a democratic polity, must represent those citizens’ in-
terests when she exercises that authority. Although there may 
be many differences between the direct democracy voter and 
the elected representative, the most basic and foundational 
similarity—the ability to make coercive law that binds others—
is the one that establishes a structural relationship of political 
representation.  
 
That the citizen who casts her ballot in a direct democracy 
election represents others is easy to perceive under a range of 
circumstances: win or lose, the voter is pulling a lever for the 
too-young, too-infirm, too-lazy, and too-felonious. Less obvious, 
but more important, is the reality that the winners must repre-
sent the losers: just as those holding traditional political office 
must represent the interests not only of those who voted for 
them, but of the whole electorate—including minorities, racial 
and otherwise30
In addition to this normative framing, there are also a va-
riety of empirical reasons to differentiate the direct democracy 
voter from the candidate election voter along representative 
lines. While none of these reasons are alone dispositive, they 
each generally cohere with the philosophic picture offered here, 
and, in so doing, help to reinforce our argument.  
—so too must direct democracy voters. These 
structural facts, which intrude at the very moment of lawmak-
ing at the polls during direct democracy, render the voter a po-
litical representative, bound to pursue the public interest. 
First, and perhaps closest to the normative core of the pa-
per, is the manner in which coalition-building, or logrolling, in 
the legislative process differentiates candidate elections from 
direct democracy. To wit, “if there are particular issues of dis-
tinctive concern to the minority community, a [legislative] rep-
resentative directly dependent on that community will have the 
 
 29. Frickey, supra note 22, at 437.  
 30. See Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Representation in America: Some 
Thoughts on Nancy Pelosi, Gavin Newsom, Tim Johnson, and Deliberative En-
gagement, 16 GOOD SOC’Y 3 (2007). 
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ability to trade her vote on issues of relative indifference to her 
constituents for other representatives’ support on those critical 
issues.”31 Although legislators may be oriented toward their 
constituents’ interests in pursuing their legislative agendas 
and considering what tradeoffs to make in legislative delibera-
tion, their ultimate loyalty must be to the public good. Howev-
er, minorities’ vision of the public good may only get its day in 
the sun through the logrolling process, which provides a specif-
ic channel through which minority interests, otherwise disre-
garded by a self-interested majority of voters, are able to gain 
respect and recognition at the legislative level.32
Yet no such protections for minority interests are clearly 
found in the procedures of direct democracy.
 
33 Generally speak-
ing, logrolling requires that there be more than one voting oc-
casion and that voting be done out in the open;34 both of these 
phenomena are absent from the channels of direct democracy. 
Single-subject rules, by which state initiatives are limited to a 
unitary topic, are a common regulation within the jurisdictions 
that practice direct democracy—and the rules are an explicit 
attempt to disable logrolling.35
 
 31. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
173, 217–18 (1989).  
 This suggests that voters in di-
 32. See id.; see also DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: 
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1999) 
(finding that the Voting Rights Act might not be helping minorities in the leg-
islative process as much as might be expected or hoped for); Daniel M. Butler 
& David E. Broockman, Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constit-
uents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463 (2011) 
(finding that white legislators tend to discriminate against black constituent 
requests and that black legislators are more responsive to them). Thanks to 
Chris Elmendorf for the pointers here. 
 33. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barri-
er to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1978) (arguing that the pri-
vacy of the voting booth makes “the referendum . . . a most effective facilitator 
of that bias, discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American democ-
racy from its earliest day”); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democ-
racy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1555–56 (1990) (criticizing plebiscites for failing to 
accommodate minority views).  
 34. Karlan, supra note 31, at 217 (“Legislative coalition-building, or log-
rolling, requires that there be more than one voting occasion. The fact that vot-
ing in legislative bodies, unlike voting in general elections, is not anonymous 
furthers this process of accommodation.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-
Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 963 (1983); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initia-
tives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35, 36 (2002); see also 
Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
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rect democracy must have a different posture: pursuing the 
public interest as political representatives. 
The differences between voter turnout in direct democracy 
and candidate elections may provide yet another practical rea-
son to differentiate the direct democracy voter from the candi-
date election voter. As a general matter, many fewer voters 
vote in direct democracy elections than in candidate elections.36 
Systematically low turnout in direct democracy elections may 
therefore underwrite thinking of the voter less as one who 
merely speaks on behalf of herself and more as one who speaks 
as a representative of the electorate. Because those who do vote 
in direct democracy elections is not a matter of sheer random-
ness—that could suggest a design of statistical “representa-
tiveness” rather than a relationship of representation37—the 
stratification of who votes likely structures the relationship of 
how they vote.38 And that is troublesome if this non-random 
subsample of citizens gets to pursue its private interests with 
no filter and no moral command to take into account the com-
monweal when making binding law.39
 
434, 456–78 (1998) (arguing that direct democracy’s pathology is that it disa-
bles logrolling). Of course, some do not think logrolling actually disappears in 
the direct democracy context. See, e.g., Kurt G. Kastorf, Comment, Logrolling 
Gets Logrolled: Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject 
Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1635 (2005). But even if it doesn’t disappear, it 
largely produces only costs rather than the benefits that can accrue to legisla-
tion through logrolling during the legislative process. See id. at 1646–52. 
 
 36. CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 186 (1992); David B. 
Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referen-
dum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 31–32 (1995); see also DAVID B. 
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 108–10 (1984) (providing a statistical analysis of voter drop 
off). 
 37. We don’t concede that randomness would enable those who vote to 
vote in their self-interest. As one of us argued in a prior paper, citizens in ju-
ries—randomly selected (in a manner)—serve in representative capacities and 
have obligations not to be self-interested in decision-making. See Leib & 
Ponet, supra note 26. We will take up this discussion in a future paper. See 
Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the 
Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 38. John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 
199 (2005).  
 39. Of course, the empirical reality of voter turnout cannot by itself sup-
port the concept of voter representation in the context of direct democracy. It 
proves too much because if it is right that the direct democracy voter is a rep-
resentative because of low turnout, then any low turnout election requires the 
voter to take on the role of the representative. That risks undermining the 
standard view of candidate elections. The argument proves too little as well, 
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Finally, it is also worth noting that traces of the distinction 
between candidate election and direct democracy voting are al-
ready embedded within American constitutional law doctrine.40 
With respect to candidate elections, the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence generally coheres with the liberal 
private-interest voting framework. As two prominent scholars 
of the law of democracy put it, “[t]he voting decisions of indi-
vidual . . . citizens [in candidate elections] are absolutely pro-
tected under the First Amendment. This is true whether they 
decline to support candidates . . . out of ignorance, selective 
sympathy or indifference, or outright racism.”41 Voting is politi-
cal speech, the very core of the freedom guaranteed by the 
amendment, or so the argument goes.42 For example, in Ander-
son v. Martin, the Supreme Court went so far as to affirm “the 
right of a citizen to cast his vote for whomever he chooses and 
for whatever reason he pleases.”43
And yet, while it may be permissible for the candidate elec-
tion voter to cast her vote “for whatever reason she pleases,” 
  
 
for it suggests that any time a direct democracy election has solid turnout—at 
least as solid as an average candidate election—the voter is no longer aligned 
in a representative relationship, but rather is left to pursue her private inter-
est free of moral condemnation. As we say above, these further empirical rea-
sons to support the citizen-as-representative view are mere supplements to the 
main normative account.  
 40. This is not to say, of course, that legal doctrine necessarily serves as a 
moral compass. As Kent Greenawalt understood years ago, these issues con-
cern “applied political philosophy, not constitutional law.” KENT GREENAWALT, 
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 4 (1995). Yet, we do think that a 
well-established line of precedent spanning many years can nonetheless help 
to reinforce a particular political-philosophic principle.  
 41. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (1996). One may have legal and constitutional pro-
tection to vote out of outright racism—but that wouldn’t bless the activity from 
a moral standpoint. 
 42. Gaus’s defense of the standard view draws on voting’s symbolic, ex-
pressive, and information-collecting function for the polity. See Gaus, supra 
note 14, at 29. As Brennan argues, however, it is hard to see why we should 
allow voting to be unconstrained just for these reasons: there are other civic 
activities—like writing letters to the editor—that are equally if not more effec-
tive at achieving those ends, without the means of risking harm to others with 
one’s vote. See BRENNAN, supra note 14, at 85–87. Whatever the merits of 
Brennan’s argument, Gaus’s exposition probably coheres better with the folk 
political morality surrounding candidate elections. 
 43. 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964); see also Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 
659, 662 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (“The first amendment assures every citi-
zen the right to ‘cast his vote for whatever reason he pleases.’”). For some 
analysis and skepticism about Anderson and whether the claim about voter 
freedom can be rooted in the First Amendment, see infra note 62. 
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the direct democracy voter enjoys no such freedom. This is be-
cause the products of direct democracy are “state action,”44 and 
state actors are restrained from acting for certain types of rea-
sons. Since direct democracy voters are acting on behalf of the 
state—and creating coercive law—they are constrained as state 
actors. Consider, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Romer v. Evans, which struck down as impermissible 
state action under the Equal Protection Clause a Colorado bal-
lot measure prohibiting state and local governments from 
adopting civil rights provisions protecting gays and lesbians.45 
In so doing, the Court specifically observed the voters’ improper 
motivation: “[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevita-
ble inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosi-
ty toward [gays and lesbians].”46
A more recent example of this type of motivation-based 
scrutiny can be seen in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in which a 
federal trial judge struck down, once again under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a ballot proposition attempting to limit mar-
riage in California to heterosexual couples.
  
47 In so doing, the 
trial judge performed “an intrusive inquiry into voters’ motiva-
tions,” which focused upon the specter of religious bigotry in 
the voting booth.48 Whether the U.S. Supreme Court will ulti-
mately uphold the lower court in Perry is unknown at the time 
of this writing,49 but the more basic point—that courts con-
strain voter sentiment or intent when it is part of state action 
in direct democracy—is deeply embedded within the Court’s ju-
risprudence.50
 
 44. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 
U.S. 188, 199 (2003); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 
(1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967). 
  
 45. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).  
 46. Id. at 634. 
 47. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996–97 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 671 F.3d 1952 (9th 
Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
 48. Tim Taylor, Note, Why We Cannot Ask Why: Ethical Independence and 
Voter Intent, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1099, 1105 (2011); see Perry, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d at 985–87. 
 49. See Lyle Denniston, “Proposition 8” Defenders’ Appeal Filed (FINAL 
UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG (July 31, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2012/07/proposition-8-appeal-filed/. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
December 7, 2012. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 786. 
 50. See cases cited supra note 44.  
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While the Court’s differential treatment of candidate elec-
tions and direct democracy generally tracks our argument, the 
fit is by no means exact: to the extent the Court is willing to 
limit, or even inquire into, voter motivations in the context of 
direct democracy, the limitations and inquiries are rooted in 
constitutional parameters set for all state actors, and not in 
any desire to hold voters to the pursuit of the public interest. 
And the Court is not pursuing actual individual voter motiva-
tions but inferring state purpose from a collective’s presump-
tive intent.  
Yet, judicial oversight of voter motivations in direct democ-
racy nonetheless stands in direct contrast with the Court’s ap-
proach to voters in candidate elections, who are granted the 
freedom to pursue their private interests without interven-
tion.51 The candidate election voter is not treated as engaging in 
“state action,” reinforcing what Larry Sager calls “solicitude for 
the sanctity of individual choice in the electoral context.”52
 
 51. It’s worth noting here that the candidate election voter’s First 
Amendment right to vote for any reason whatsoever is a significant step be-
yond the liberal conception of candidate electoral voting in the private inter-
est. Nonetheless, this variance does not undercut the more basic point here 
about the Court’s bifurcated approach to candidate election voting and direct 
democracy voting.  
 But 
because the product of direct democracy is coercive law and the 
 52. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin 
and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 
1421 (1978). Indeed, on this point the Supreme Court has also been explicit: 
“[T]he selection of state officials . . . through election by all qualified voters” 
does not constitute state action. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
614, 626 (1991). But see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: 
Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 377, 434–36 (2012) (relying on Supreme Court precedent, in-
cluding Edmonson, to support the argument that “the putting in office of an 
official cloaked with coercive lawmaking or law-enforcement authority should 
be treated as a ‘public function’ within the meaning of the state action doc-
trine”). Of course, the fact that the convoluted “conceptual disaster area,” 
Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreward: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967), that is the state action 
doctrine distinguishes between direct democracy and candidate election voters 
does not itself do the heavy lifting for the potentially unfamiliar moral claim 
that direct democracy voters are political representatives. State action—for 
the purposes of doctrine and philosophical analysis—is not a primordial con-
cept with completely stable boundaries; indeed, the Supreme Court itself is not 
impressed with the level of consistency achieved by the doctrine either. See 
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (citing Edmon-
son, 500 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). For an impressive recent effort 
to make sense of it, see Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 281 (2013). 
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voters in direct democracy are state actors, direct democracy 
voters are constrained in the kinds of reasons upon which they 
may act.53
To briefly sum up, the direct democracy voter’s authoriza-
tion to make coercive law, and the concomitant lack of filtering 
when this authority is exercised, provides the normative basis 
for rendering the direct democracy voter a political representa-
tive. Furthermore, the lack of logrolling in direct democracy—
and the additional burdens this imposes upon minority inter-
ests—as well as the low levels of voter turnout in direct democ-
racy elections reinforce this point. Finally, the Court’s bifurcat-
ed approach to candidate election and direct democracy voting, 
although not a perfect parallel, generally supports differentiat-
ing between candidate election voters and direct democracy 
voters and their obligations in their voting activity. The next 
Part considers the implications of this view of the direct democ-
racy voter in greater detail and considers a few objections.  
  
III.  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATION   
We have shown that the private-interest voting model en-
visioned by the Madisonian account of representative democra-
cy is inappropriate in the context of direct democracy and that 
it simply cannot be squared with the duties the voter owes to 
her fellow citizens in that context. By exercising state authority 
that binds other citizens, the direct democracy voter becomes a 
representative and is bound by the ethics of representation: to 
pursue vigorously the interests of the represented and to refuse 
to self-deal. But we have to say more about the contours of the-
se duties.  
The most obvious issue surrounding the public-interest 
voting obligation is how to demarcate what counts as pursuing 
the public interest. One might question, for example, whether it 
 
 53. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 
(1985) (“It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or 
otherwise, could not order city action violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (emphasizing that 
state action enacted via the populace is still subject to constitutional limita-
tions). BeVier and Harrison distinguish in the state action doctrine between 
principals “entitled to act on their own behalf” and “agents acting on behalf of 
others.” Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its 
Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1768 (2010). This turns out to map pretty well on 
our distinction in this paper between voters acting in candidate elections 
(when they are acting on their own behalf) and voters acting in direct democ-
racy (when they are acting on behalf of others).  
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is truly even possible to separate the public interest from pri-
vate interests. Some argue that “self-denying charity is often a 
great source of benefit[] to oneself” and that acting altruistical-
ly is really “acting for one’s own greatest benefit.”54
When a voter goes into the voting booth to vote on an initi-
ative in direct democracy, we imagine that she would find it co-
herent and meaningful to ask herself what her true motive in 
voting one way or another is—and that she is capable of sup-
pressing her private interests in order to channel her thinking 
toward a credible view of the public good.
 Others may 
contend that all private interests can be generalized into some 
theory of the public interest. Whatever the difficulties of identi-
fying precise conceptual contours, however, we are comfortable 
that the distinction between the private interest and public in-
terest remains sensible in most cases for the vast majority of 
citizens. 
55 Good faith pursuit 
of the public interest is not easily reducible to bad faith pursuit 
of self-interest. For although “we can no longer plausibly argue 
that there is a known and agreed ‘public interest,’”56
Yet, it would be insufficient to conclude that a voter must 
vote consistently with her sense of public interest without a 
concomitant obligation to execute her task of voting with some 
degree of diligence.
 we think it 
is not hard to acknowledge that certain kinds of voting—say, 
out of mere ethnic pride or solely to lower one’s own tax bur-
den—cannot plausibly be interpreted to be in the public inter-
est. It doesn’t require too much faith in the American people to 
believe that the average voter knows in her heart when she is 
being selfish and when she is being other-regarding. It would 
be a good first step for voters to ask themselves this question 
before casting their votes in a direct democracy election. 
57
 
 54. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 37 (1957). 
 Thus the ethical voter cannot just intro-
 55. As explained earlier, empirical data actually suggests that sociotropic 
voting better describes actual voter behavior than private interest voting. See 
supra note 8. 
 56. Paul Finn, Public Trust and Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224, 
232 n.20 (1994). 
 57. See BRENNAN, supra note 14, at 70, 128–29 (arguing that a voter must 
use a reasonable standard of care such that she justifiably believes the candi-
date or policy will promote the common good). Brennan thinks his view applies 
to all voters, including those in candidate elections. See id. at 86. Indeed, he 
draws no distinction between direct democracy voters and candidate voters. 
See id. at 129 (“[V]oters must be justified in believing that the candidate or 
policy they vote for will promote the common good . . . .” (emphasis added)). As 
we argue here, however, one can reject Brennan’s arguments about voters in 
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spect to ensure that she “means well” before casting her ballot; 
she must also make an affirmative effort to calibrate her vote to 
accord with a credible view of the public good.58 For while every 
voter is morally entitled a berth of discretion to pursue the pub-
lic interest as she best conceives it, that conception—as well as 
the voter’s effort at translating that conception into a particular 
vote—must be credible.59 In other words, the citizen who takes 
on the “office of voter” in direct democracy ought to pick the pol-
icy that, given the evidence, can be reasonably expected to 
promote citizen interests overall.60 The policy she picks must be 
evidence-based rather than intuition-based, and there must be 
a plausible logical and causal connection between the policy 
and the promotion of the common good.61
Staking out the position we have here requires us to con-
sider some basic objections. For one, recalling the intuition 
supporting the standard view, a voter might reasonably ask 
whether direct democracy voting isn’t just a form of expressive 
speech, too. And if it is, then why wouldn’t some moral corol-
lary of the First Amendment protect this form of core political 
expression? Although our concern here isn’t First Amendment 
doctrine in the courts,
  
62
 
candidate elections and still apply some of his arguments to voters in direct 
democracy. 
 it is important to emphasize that we 
 58. See id. at 128–29.  
 59. See id. 
 60. See id.; see also id. at 113–17 (discussing the meaning of “common 
good” and providing examples, including “well-functioning markets, liberal 
democratic government, the rule of law . . . greater wealth, longer and healthi-
er lives, and lives with more cultural, and social opportunities”).  
 61. See id. at 161–63 (arguing that justified voters must be “well informed 
and rational” in believing a policy or candidate promotes the common good). 
 62. If that were the point of departure, there is some reason to believe 
that the First Amendment might not as easily extend to voting as suggested 
by Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). The Court recognizes that 
“voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional struc-
ture,” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992), and that the “expression 
of a political view implicates a First Amendment right.” Doe v. Reed, 130 S. 
Ct. 2811, 2817 (2010). Indeed, Reed held that citizens’ petition signing is an 
inherently expressive activity subject to First Amendment protection (but one 
that is not inviolable and can be subject to disclosure). See id. at 2818. Howev-
er, in the context of candidate elections, Burdick emphasized that “the func-
tion of the election process is to winnow out . . . candidates, not to provide a 
means of giving vent to short-range political goals, pique, or personal quar-
rel[s]. Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive function would 
undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.” 
Burdick, 508 U.S. at 438 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed: “the purpose of casting, counting, 
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are not arguing for enforcement of the direct democracy voter’s 
moral duties through the legal system—we only identify the ex-
istence of the ethical framework. Indeed, it would be both prac-
tically impossible and normatively undesirable to attempt to 
prosecute individual voters for failing to uphold their represen-
tational obligations, bringing the coercive force of the state to 
bear on this moral command.63
 
and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum 
for political participation.” Id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 But that doesn’t change the cal-
culus of whether individual voters are constrained in the moral 
realm: the legal freedom to speak—even if it applies in this con-
text—does not preclude moral judgment for how one speaks. 
 Is voting in direct democracy, then, more like signing referendum peti-
tions (which “implicates” a First Amendment right under Reed) or like electing 
officials (which may not under Burdick)? We have sympathy for Justice Scal-
ia’s view in his concurrence in Reed, where he argues that a voter in direct 
democracy is “acting as a legislator [and] is therefore exercising legislative 
power.” Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2833 (Scalia, J., concurring). This is not protectable 
expression, Scalia argues, because there is “no precedent . . . holding that leg-
islating is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. Indeed, in the most recent 
case on point, Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, Scalia persuaded an 
eight-justice majority to agree that voting as a legislator is not expressive, and 
is not protected by the First Amendment. See 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–53 (2011). 
Carrigan limited—or at least clarified—Reed by noting that voting, in general, 
is not inherently expressive. See id. at 2351 (rejecting the argument that Reed 
established the “expressive character of voting”). Rather, only certain political 
acts, such as citizens signing a petition, are sufficiently expressive, while other 
acts, such as voting by legislators, are not. Putting Burdick, Reed, and 
Carrigan together enables one to conclude that if voters voting in direct de-
mocracy elections are representative governmental actors, they might not 
have First Amendment protection. See id. at 2351 n.5 (“A legislator voting on a 
bill is not fairly analogized to one simply discussing that bill or expressing an 
opinion for or against it. The former is performing a governmental act as a 
representative of his constituents; only the latter is exercising personal First 
Amendment rights.” (citations omitted)).  
 63. There is, we acknowledge, a visceral objection to telling voters that 
they are constrained in what they may “say” in the voting booth when voting 
directly on policy. But our argument is about what they should say as a moral 
matter, not what the law requires them to say with any specificity. Like legis-
lative and executive representatives, voters in direct democracy do not, as po-
litical representatives, have unfettered speech rights from a moral perspective. 
For example, the “government speech” doctrine highlights how the right of the 
state to express itself is neither wholly unfettered nor wholly constrained. 
Since the core of the argument here analogizes the direct democracy electorate 
to state action, the speech within that practice might be analogized to gov-
ernment speech. For an introduction to the government speech doctrine, see 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Gov-
ernmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 611–19 (2008) and Joseph Blocher, View-
point Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011). 
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One may be free to speak in favor of the KKK, but this does not 
disable others from finding such speech morally blameworthy. 
And yet, although it would be undesirable to use the force 
of law to enforce the moral command to vote in the public inter-
est at the individual voter level, it could be acceptable and po-
tentially attractive to police the electorate collectively for ex-
treme default of this obligation. Direct democracy’s enactments 
are judicially policed for “saying” things offensive to the com-
monweal (like expressing discriminatory preferences); and even 
legislators can disregard the electorate’s commands when they 
depart too far from the public interest, which must be protected 
in a legitimate state. Other state actors take oaths of fidelity to 
the public good that could require disrupting or challenging an-
other state institution’s failure to abide by their obligations as 
representatives. 
There is also another way of envisioning a method of rein-
forcing the moral command to pursue the public interest with-
out judicially policing each citizen’s private motives and evi-
dence-based reasoning: by doing away with the private vote 
within direct democracy.64
 
 64. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Doe v. Reed suggests the probable con-
stitutionality and potential virtues of such a system. See 130 S. Ct. at 2834 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “history of voting in the United States 
completely undermines th[e] claim” that the First Amendment protects “the 
right to vote anonymously”); id. at 2837 (“There are laws against threats and 
intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our peo-
ple have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring people 
to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without 
which democracy is doomed.”). 
 Institutional design is a way to rein-
force social norms without needing to bring the force of law to 
bear directly in a domain where it is likely incompetent in any 
event. By designing a direct democracy that provides more 
transparency and accountability for how people vote, there is a 
higher likelihood that people will fulfill their primary duty to 
pursue their visions of the public good. After all, being watched 
often encourages people to do the right thing, even when the 
law won’t punish them for doing the wrong thing. 
 For an engaging essay on the history of private and non-written voting, 
see Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used to Vote, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/10/13/081013fa_fact_ 
lepore?currentPage=all. More academic inquiries are available in John C. 
Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: 
Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483 (2003) and L. E. 
FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN REFORM 
(1968). 
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A second quite important objection focuses on the fact that 
we seem to be asking too much of voters. One could think the 
epistemic demands of representation are too high; by requiring 
voters to find out what is in the public interest, and requiring 
them to engage in evidence-based reasoning in effectuating 
their votes, we are demanding that they devote more time to 
democracy than is truly ideal.65 This objection is sometimes 
called the “epistocracy” objection.66 Given the well-known liter-
ature on voter ignorance,67 it may be too much to make a moral 
demand of voters that they discover and rely upon only hard 
evidence for what is in the public interest. Voters in direct de-
mocracy almost certainly have serious cross-cutting obligations 
to their families, their friends, and their communities, and may 
very well have other venues for exercising their “civic virtue,” 
such as in the workplace or within an activist political frame-
work.68 If we insist that it is a wrong to vote only in one’s own 
personal interest—which one might assume people know best 
and without much analysis69
 
 65. Direct democracy performs relatively poorly on most measures of cor-
rect voting. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE 
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 121–22 (1992). On the 
other hand, Lau and Redlawsk’s optimistic model found correct voting preva-
lent in the electorate. See Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Cor-
rectly, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585, 590–91 (1997) (“[V]oters in our experiment 
. . . do a pretty good job of selecting the candidate for whom they would have 
voted had there been . . . full information . . . .”). But those results are probably 
overestimated because the model did not account for immoral or unethical vot-
ing. See BRENNAN, supra note 14, at 167 (criticizing the Lau & Redlawsk mod-
el on this ground). Our implicit model of correct voting, which does account for 
this normative dimension, owes its origin to Brennan’s theory of voting ethics. 
See id. 
—or that it is wrong to vote based 
 66. See, e.g., BRENNAN, supra note 14, at 95.  
 67. See, e.g., SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMO-
CRATIC POLITICS (2003); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT 
AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); Ilya Somin, 
Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413 (1998). For a 
recent meditation on this topic, see Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schlei-
cher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2010115. Low levels of constitutional and legal literacy also permeate the pub-
lic. See, e.g., Michael Serota, Intelligible Justice, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649, 
659–62 (2012); Michael Serota, Essay, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1658–62 (2012). 
 68. See BRENNAN, supra note 14, at 43–67 (exploring what it might mean 
to have civic virtue without politics). 
 69. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 113. Let’s leave to one side the debate 
about THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? (2004) (arguing 
that some voters, specifically low-income Americans in the Midwest, may un-
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on mere intuition about what is in the public interest, we are 
asking of voters something that may be beyond the reach of or-
dinary citizens and could divert them from more important ac-
tivities.  
Let us be clear, then, about the relatively low bar we think 
is required of the direct democracy voter to fulfill her obliga-
tions as a representative: the voter need only have a credible 
belief that her vote promotes the best interests of the public. 
This means that the voter may get wrong what the public in-
terest is—after all, our nation’s elected officials are routinely 
mistaken—without being morally culpable so long as her mis-
taken belief was credible and based on meaningful evidence 
when her vote was cast.70 And while identifying the precise con-
tours of this minimum epistemic threshold is likely to be diffi-
cult in a particular case, surpassing this threshold will not be. 
The direct democracy voter need not solely depend upon her 
own empirical and normative analysis; she can also supple-
ment, or even supplant, her individual deliberation by relying 
upon heuristics such as endorsements from political newspa-
pers and public interest organizations.71
 
knowingly vote contrary to their self-interest, due to a “derangement” of politi-
cal ideology and a “backlash” against liberalism). 
 Moreover, given the 
low probability of any voter’s ability to effectuate an outcome, 
this limited duty of care can be calibrated to the underlying 
risk of harm the voter creates. Ultimately, a PhD in public poli-
cy and/or moral philosophy is not necessary for a direct democ-
 70. For an explanation of such a threshold, see BRENNAN, supra note 14, 
at 95–111.  
 71. This creates an additional obligation of reasonable heuristic selection. 
For example, relying upon the editorial board of the well-regarded and apoliti-
cal Lake Woebegon Gazette on a smoking tax will be credible. Relying upon a 
mail flyer from the Association of Lake Woebegon Tobacco Companies on the 
same issue will not. Admittedly, there is a danger that even an objectively-
minded newspaper or public interest organization will be unable to offer an 
evidence-based endorsement, given the lack of the cues generated by political 
parties, upon which newspapers presumably rely. See generally Ethan J. Leib 
& Christopher Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and 
Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69 (2012) (explaining that 
direct democracy might be improved with better party-based cues); see also 
DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE 
POWER OF MONEY (2000) (discussing how direct democracy is substantially 
infected by misleading media campaigns that do not conduce to long-term dia-
logue between competing sides as in party politics). Another part of the prob-
lem is that deceivingly named organizations can infect the cue system in direct 
democracy—so the voter does have to be on guard and look to the real source 
of the cue. We are comfortable, however, that in most instances reliance upon 
a respectable newspaper endorsement will satisfy our epistemic requirement.  
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racy voter to meet her duties as a representative; rather, the 
direct democracy voter need only make an affirmative effort to 
discover the public interest and to find some meaningful evi-
dence that links her policy choice to the promotion of the public 
interest.  
This low bar raises a further question, however: can a voter 
claim that voting in her private interest is actually itself in the 
public interest? That is, the private interest voter might claim 
that the public good would be best promoted by allowing and 
encouraging egoistical voting. Whether or not the argument is 
supported by a substantive view about maximizing personal 
freedom for all, or a supposition about how an “invisible hand” 
will produce the common good with the aggregation of private 
interest votes,72 it is possible to construct a view that would 
“excuse” private-interest voting by the individual, even if the 
public good must be pursued as a function of her representative 
status. Although we would need a different paper to investigate 
whether any of these arguments for private-interest voting can 
withstand careful scrutiny (that is, is that view evidence-
based?), for our purposes it is sufficient to say that if a direct 
democracy voter credibly believes in good faith, and based on 
actual evidence, that it is in the public interest to vote her pri-
vate interest, rather than merely rationalizing to herself an ex-
cuse to vote her own personal pocketbook, that could be suffi-
cient to meet her moral obligation as a representative.73
As if we haven’t sauntered into too many minefields as it is 
in making our core argument, there is yet another deep and 
important issue lurking here: what does our view have to say to 
those who vote in direct democracy largely on the basis of 
strongly-felt religious views? Are those who vote for religious 
reasons when they vote in direct democracy meeting their obli-
gations as political representatives? 
  
The broad ambit of this question about the permissible role 
of religious reasons in political choice implicates a rich litera-
ture with subtle arguments on each side, in both constitutional 
theory and political philosophy.74
 
 72. See BRENNAN, supra note 
 For our purposes, though, we 
14, at 124–27 (criticizing the “invisible 
hand” argument based on the disanalogy between politics and markets). 
 73. It’s worth noting here that at least one study has found that unin-
formed altruistic voting is much more dangerous to the common good than vot-
ing that is self-interested but informed. See Caplan, supra note 8, at 416.  
 74. The work of Kent Greenawalt is an essential guide for thoughtful ap-
proaches to these issues. See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 40, at 1–5; 
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).  
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need not settle these questions beyond the quite limited reach 
of our argument for the immorality of private interest voting in 
the context of direct democracy—and concomitant affirmative 
obligation to vote for a credible conception of the public good. 
Those who vote for religious reasons are generally not pursuing 
their own private welfare, but are instead often acting in pur-
suit of something they genuinely believe to be in the welfare of 
all, with their own set of evidence-based stories about why cer-
tain types of voting are in the public interest. For these rea-
sons, such voters could be understood to be meeting their obli-
gations so long as there is a credible way of moving from the 
underlying genuinely held religious belief to an authentic view 
about the public good. Whether such voters deriving their sense 
of the public good from religion run afoul of other contested 
moral commands—to provide public reasons for justifiable po-
litical action that all could accept or none could reasonably re-
ject;75
  CONCLUSION   
 to forbid the state (or private persons) to discriminate on 
the basis of creed or religion in the public sphere; or to refuse to 
establish religion in a liberal state—extends beyond the scope 
of our argument here and would require its own treatment. We 
suspect our commitment to voters in direct democracy as state 
actors and political representatives might be relevant to that 
inquiry, but we do not pursue those potential applications in 
this context. 
Our main effort here has been to show that even if political 
morality’s standard view of voting in candidate elections holds, 
it cannot easily be applied to voting in direct democracy. Direct 
democracy, as we have argued, is more “representative” than is 
usually understood—and voters have obligations similar to 
those of political representatives when they are voting on law 
directly. Admittedly, this vision upends the well-settled distinc-
tion between direct and representative democracy. But we 
think the theory and practice of direct democracy invites think-
ing about the voting activity there as constrained by the moral 
limits of political representation, and accordingly requires di-
rect democracy voters to refrain from voting in service of their 
 
 75. See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998); 
James Bohman & Henry Richardson, Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and 
“Reasons That All Can Accept,” 17 J. POL. PHIL. 253 (2009); T.M. Scanlon, 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
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private interests. A direct democracy supported by public inter-
est votes may still be far from perfect, but it is surely a more 
normatively desirable means of law-making than the private-
interest-oriented alternative.  
 
